In Defense Of Wendy Runge

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Written by Rabbi Chaim Goldberger

Thursday, 16 June 2011 10:00

Let me state from the outset that I am opposed to gratuitous charges of racism or anti-Semitism. Such claims have become tools too easily used to batter an ideological or political opponent into undue submission.

But bias can and does exist. Even in our cultured and progressive world, instances have been known to occur in which conclusions have been reached as a result of preconceived perceptions about a member of a racial or religious group, conclusions in many cases grossly unsupported by the facts.

The only way to discern true prejudice from intemperate hysteria is to examine the facts of a given case.

I refer to the case of State of Iowa v. Mrs. Wendy Weiner Runge, which has recently taken an unexpected and malevolent turn. When we last reported on this story, Mrs. Rungeâ€™s trial had ended with a plea deal, releasing Wendy from all but one charge, to which she admitted guilt. She had substituted one named future film project for another on an application for state financial credit, an action she took only after having been assured by the authorized state official that it was permissible. As it turned out, the officialâ€™s assurance was in error. The substitution was, in fact, against the law, and Mrs. Runge accepted responsibility for this mistake in the court of Judge Douglas Staskal.

In the plea arrangement, not only did Mrs. Runge agree to plead to the one count, she also agreed to cooperate in the prosecutionâ€™s ongoing investigation of any other filmmakers against whom the state had filed complaints.

In exchange, the attorney general agreed to drop all other charges against Mrs. Runge, including all charges of financial misconductâ€”all of which she had denied vigorously from the outset and none of which the state could proveâ€”and to refrain from having the judge pass sentence on her guilty plea until after all other court proceedings in this matter were complete (assumed to be at least a year or more down the road). Compared to the ominous threat of immediate and lengthy prison time that had faced the mother of four throughout her trial, this eleventh-hour deal was embraced by Wendy and her legal team with great relief and even celebration.

It was, therefore, more than jarring when Mrs. Runge received a notice from the judge less than two months later summoning her to an immediate sentencing hearing on her charge. She had cooperated fully when the DA sent an investigator to interview her about the other defendants. What had gone wrong?

Evidently, what the state wanted from Mrs. Runge was more than cooperation. They wanted a smoking gun they could use to prove guilt against the other defendants. Mrs. Runge had consistently asserted that such a thing did not exist, as no financial conspiracy had ever taken place. And so, despite opening all her records to the prosecutors, and despite telling the truth as she knew it, the attorney general decided Wendy was not being cooperative and he reneged on the deal.

And so, as swift as it was disheartening, the attorney general sent a note to Judge Staskal saying he was no longer interested in using Mrs. Runge as a witness in any upcoming trials and thus there was no longer a reason to delay her sentencing.

This is where things really took a dark turn. Two associates of Mrs. Runge on the film The Scientist had earlier pleaded guilty to felony theft. (No wrongdoing on anyoneâ€™s part was ever proven in court. The associates decided to take the guilty plea to avoid the enormous expense of mounting a legal defense.)

The two were sentenced on that same day by Judge Staskal to probation. With regard to Wendyâ€™s sentence, the pre-sentence assessor, taking into account the relatively minor nature of the charge, her being a first time offender, and her being a solid community citizen responsible for the care of four children and an elderly father-in-law, recommended Wendy be given a suspended (no actual jail time) sentence.

Shockingly, Judge Staskal ignored the recommendation and sentenced her to ten years in prisonâ€”the maximum sentence allowed.

How did Judge Staskal justify the disparity in his penalties? He claimed Mrs. Runge showed no remorse over her crime. Had she spoken out defiantly at the hearing, such a conclusion might have been warranted. But in fact what she did at the hearing was read a statement expressing appropriate regret commensurate with her crimeâ€”apologizing to the state for having assumed the assurance of the state official was sufficient to rely upon when in fact it was not. She did not apologize for theft, because no money had changed hands; she did not apologize for financial misconduct, because there was none. But to Iowaâ€™s justice system, which had desperately wanted to nail her on these charges, this was defiance.

The judge went further. Where was the evidence of Mrs. Rungeâ€™s lack of remorse? In entries on her personal blog expressing joy over the dropping of the original charges, and in an earlier newspaper article in which Wendy was quoted as wondering what might have caused the assistant attorney general to bring up Sholom Rubashkinâ€™s recent conviction at a deposition. In the judgeâ€™s words, Wendy Runge failed to demonstrate sufficient remorse, as evidenced by entries on her blog alleging vague conspiracies and an article alleging anti-Semitism.

The judge issued a harsher sentence to a lesser crime on the grounds that he believed he was being falsely accused of anti-Semitism? Methinks he doth protest too much.

The facts of Mrs. Rungeâ€™s case do not match with the aura assigned it by this judge. The plain facts an impartial judge is to consider in passing sentence include only the charge for which the defendant was found guilty, not charges that were dismissed; mitigating factors (which Mrs. Runge has in abundance); the seriousness and/or violent nature of the charge (little to none here); the recommendation of the pre-sentence assessor; and parallels to others similarly charged. The judgeâ€™s decision fails on all five.

Prejudice, in its purest state, indicates a prior leaning to judge a person based on your perception of his proclivity to commit the offenseâ€”irrespective of his actually having done so. From the beginning, Mrs. Runge was treated as one who was likely to have committed all the crimes for which she was charged. Despite her dogged insistence on having been misled by state officials acknowledged to have misrepresented the stateâ€™s tax credit program, despite the state having been unable to prove a single charge against Wendy or any of her associates, despite the utter inadmissibility of personal, out-of-court communications into any aspect of a judicial hearing without due process, and despite the legitimacy of Wendy expressing a natural sense of joy and vindication on her personal blog, Judge Staskal continued to relate to her as a criminal mastermind who had somehow managed to slip through the system.

According to the Victim Impact Statements and Pre-Sentencing Probation Reports section of the Womenâ€™s Justice Center Handbook: â€œIn most all cases, judges abide by the sentencing recommendation that is formulated by the pre-sentencing probation officer.â€

In his attempt to justify straying wildly from this recommendation, Judge Staskal has crossed serious boundary lines touching on questions of judicial bias, presumption of innocence, and First Amendment free speech rights.

Let us take a look at another recent sentencing, that of Former U.S. House Majority Leader Tom DeLay. Unlike Wendy Runge, Tom DeLay was verbally defiant at his sentencing: â€œEverything I did was covered by accountants and lawyers telling me what I had to do to stay within the law. I canâ€™t be remorseful for something I donâ€™t think I did.â€

DeLay called the case â€œpolitically motivatedâ€ and spoke about how it had affected his wifeâ€™s health, forced him to raise and spend $10 million in legal fees, and cost him everything he had worked forâ€”including the second-highest post in the U.S. House.

As with Wendy, the prosecutors in the DeLay case wanted a ten-year sentence and said he should not receive probation because he had shown no remorse.

Tom DeLay was convicted of a crime scheme designed to launder money and illegally influence Texas elections. He is a major public figure. He was openly defiant at his sentencing. He does not have a large family to care for at home.

How long a sentence did Mr. DeLay receive? Three years.

Compare that with the treatment given Mrs. Runge. Mrs. Runge pleaded her own guilt. She was misled by a State official. She received no State money as a result of her crime. She spoke with no defiance in court, restricting her frustrations to personal communications that are supposed to be outside the reach of the court.

What did she get? Ten years.

Is this prejudice? I believe Iâ€™ve supplied abundant evidence. You decide. But in any case, we must reach out in support of Mrs. Runge and her family. Her attorney believes she has a powerful case for reversal on appeal, but the appellate process is costly. Moshe and Chavi Schmell continue to make themselves available as the local contact for fundraising efforts, and Rav Michel Twerski remains on record that this mitzvah qualifies as pidyon shevuyimâ€”the highest rank among opportunities for tzedakah. We look forward to sharing news of Wendyâ€™s redemptionâ€”and indeed that of all Klal Yisraelâ€”with you in the very near future.

If you wish to donate to the Runge Legal Fund, checks may be sent to 4330 W. 28th Street, St Louis Park, Mn. 55416.