By Rabbi Yair Hoffman

By Rabbi Yair Hoffman

Much like other features of Jewish consumerism (such as $180 mezuzah cases, $6,000 wedding gowns, $800 tallis bags, and $250 makeup application), the shul candyman’s inventory has, well, evolved. In the 1950s and 60s, the shul candyman had maybe a dozen lollipops on him. Now many candymen have bags and bags of various confections with all the bells and whistles. Would it be possible to write an entire sefer on the topic of “the shul candyman?” 

Before attacking this topic for being frivolous, the reader should be aware that these types of articles serve to shed light on numerous halachic areas. What possible topics might be included in such a sefer? In this article we will explore the following areas of halachah:

Is money spent on candy to give out in shul included in “hotza’os Shabbos? The Gemara (Beitzah 15b) tells us that money we spend for Shabbos and yom tov is excluded from the predetermined sum we are destined to make that year. Hashem covers these expenditures. The Gemara previously (Beitzah 12a) uses the expression, “Borrow on My account and I shall pay—lavu alai v’ani porei’a.” Hashem covers these expenses and underwrites the costs.

Is hotza’os Shabbos limited to food or would it include other items as well? Rav Meir Brandsdorfer, zt’l, a dayan of the Eidah HaChareidis, in his Knei Bosem (Vol. III #13) writes explicitly that only food and drink are included. He cites as proof that the verse in the eighth chapter of Nechemia only mentions food and drink, and this verse is the source of the entire ruling. The halachos of the Purim seudah that the mitzvah is only during the seudah may illuminate Rav Bransdorfer’s view, too.

Is it a mitzvah to give out candy to children to encourage them to like coming to shul? The Shitah Mekubetzes (Beitzah 15b) cites the Ritva’s view that all expenditures for mitzvos are included within this exemption. According to the Ritva, you get back money that you spend on any mitzvah—which would likely include getting children to come to shul and enjoy being there. The Gemara itself extends the exemption to expenses for talmud Torah for one’s children and also rosh chodesh as well. Perhaps this might give precedent to be more inclusive of the Shabbos expenditures that are exempt.

Is money spent on an impressive array of candy also included in hotza’os Shabbos? Rav Shmuel Kamenetsky, shlita, once explained to Rabbi Daniel Kleinman (Koveitz Halachos Shabbos Vol. page 11) that excessive or luxurious purchases, however, would not be included in the deductible hotza’os Shabbos exemption unless the person is on a remarkably high level of bitachon—a level that is not to be found in modern times.

This author would like to suggest that we can infer from the Gemara in Bava Kamma (9a), which says that hiddur mitzvah is only to one-third, that mitzvah items such as an esrog box would not be a fully deductible expense. This would indicate that the concept of hotza’os Shabbos and yom tov is limited to food and drink. However, the aforementioned Ritva would also have had to understand the Gemara in Bava Kamma.

Rav Elyashiv, zt’l, seems to have had a more nuanced view. The Shvus Yitzchak (section on electricity, 19:1) cites a ruling from Rav Elyashiv that the concept only includes tzorchei Shabbos and not luxuries. The Aruch HaShulchan (Orech Chaim 250:4) writes quite clearly, however, that purchasing more meat and wine is included in the expense exemption. Perhaps the contradiction could be resolved by assuming that only in regard to extra meat and wine we would say that they fit into the definition of tzorchei Shabbos, the needs of Shabbos.

Is hotza’os Shabbos limited to your own food or would it include food for others as well? Rav Chaim Kanievsky was asked (see Ohr L’Yaakov page 72) whether the exemption included guests who would have their own food to eat had they not been invited. He responded that these expenditures are also exempt. It could be, however, that the exemption only applies to actual house guests and not to what is given out in shul.

As a side note, the Mishnah Berurah (252:2) writes that regarding whatever one purchases for Shabbos, it is worthwhile to verbally express, “I am purchasing this for the honor of Shabbos.” The Machatzis HaShekel explains that through the verbalized words, the holiness of Shabbos will enter the item itself. Most candymen do not promote this Mishnah Berurah.

Is the candy forbidden because it causes children to eat before Kiddush? Is there a prohibition of “lo sa’achilem”—feeding something that is prohibited to another—in giving a child candy before he or she has heard Kiddush? The prohibition applies even to a child below the age of chinuch.

An interesting source regarding this topic is found in the Magen Avraham’s comments on the words of the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 269:1) regarding the custom to make Kiddush in shul on Friday night. The halachah states that the person making Kiddush should not drink, but matimo l’katan—he lets a child taste of it. The Magen Avraham gives four reasons why it is not a violation of lo saachilem.

• This is only a bitul asei and not a lo sa’aseh.

• There is a minority view which holds that there is no actual prohibition of drinking before Kiddush

• a third possible reason is that there is no other option for making Kiddush for travelers.

• A fourth reason (based on the Beis Yosef in Siman 343) citing Rishonim is that the chachamim never made a prohibition on anything for rabisa d’tinok—the child’s growth and development. There is an issue of the child learning a bad trait here, but the Magen Avraham rules that if it is not a set thing it would be permitted.

Some of these reasons might apply to our case too. Reasons three and four would not apply to candymen unless the rabbi says that candymen should only operate one or two weeks a month and switch off (much like Rav Moshe Feinstein’s heter to celebrate Thanksgiving).

Is there a lifnei iver (halachic stumbling block) in accustoming children to partake in sweets? Let’s remember that 37.3 million Americans (1 in 10) have diabetes and another 96 million American adults—more than 1 in 3—have prediabetes.

Is there a lifnei iver in causing children to lie and steal to get what they want? The impressive array of candy has given birth to specific rules, such as “No more than two candies per child.” But is that only in one visit to the candyman or the whole day? Some kids fudge things a bit. Also, what happens when the candyman or the appointed gabbai is not there?

Is there a lifnei iver in causing children to throw wrappers on the floor and not pick them up, talk during shul, or walk in front of people who are davening? All of these questions can be answered with one concept—the three ways to resolve a major contradiction in lifnei iver. Depending upon how we resolve the apparent contradiction, we will gain new insight into the parameters and guidelines of lifnei iver even beyond the cases under discussion themselves.

There is a concept known in halachah as teliyah—that whenever it is possible to assume a permitted purpose, even if that possibility is statistically or factually dubious, we do so.

The Gemara in Nedarim 62a tells us that Rav Ashi had an avah, a forest, that he sold to an avodah zara fire temple. When asked about lifnei iver, he responded that most of the wood would be for ordinary heating and not avodah zara. The Ran explains that it is permitted because of teliyah. The Ran’s view is cited by the Taz in Y.D. 151. The Chasam Sofer in a responsum (Y.D. #9) fully explains this idea.

However, there are other passages in the Gemara that indicate that there is a prohibition of lifnei iver whenever a strong likelihood of a violation exists. In Bava Metzia 75b, we see that it is a violation of lifnei iver to loan money when there are no witnesses. There is also such an indication from Bava Metzia 5b.

One approach to resolving the contradiction is that whenever there is a greater probability of a violation than a non-violation, then we do not assume a permitted purpose, and there is no lifnei iver. This is the approach of the HaGaos Tosfos Anshei Shem in Mishnayos Shviis 5:7 and the TaZ in Y.D. 151. 

Another approach is that the Talmudic cases that forbid it when the likelihood of a violation is stronger are only a rabbinic lifnei iver (see Tzitz Eliezer Vol. IV 5:3). [This would create an additional leniency, in case of a doubt, as we are more lenient on rabbinic lifnei iver than biblical lifnei iver.]

Rav Dovid Feinstein, zt’l, related his approach to resolving the contradiction. He explained that if the action being performed will directly lead to a violation on the part of the recipient, and without it the recipient would not have had the desire to violate halachah, then it is a violation of lifnei iver. Rav Feinstein’s view is recorded in this author’s sefer on lifnei iver titled “Misguiding the Perplexed” on page 97. [It is also a possibility offered by the Tzitz Eliezer as well.]

The issue is one with many differing opinions. The issues have deep roots throughout halachic history. But in conclusion, as we can see here, there is certainly enough material for an entire book. 

The author can be reached at yairhoffman2@gmail.com.

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